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Crowding out of private and public 
capital accumulation in an 
international context 
Theo  van de Klundert 
The paper analyses the impact of government budget deficits in a two-country 9eneral 
equilibrium  model  with  imperfect  commodity  substitution  and  imperfect  capital 
mobility.  Account  is taken  of optimizin9  agents, finite  lives,  capital accumulation, 
intertemporal budget constraints for 9overnments and private sectors, current account 
dynamics and  floatin9 exchange rates. The long-run effects of crowdin9 out of  private 
and public capital accumulation  are of primary concern in the paper.  To satisfy the 
solvency  condition  of the 9overnments proportional  control rules for  taxation  and 
public investment are applied.  Numerical methods are used to trace the effects of a 
unilateral increase in exhaustive 9overnment spending. 
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Governments  run  deficits  for  some  time  to  obtain 
short-run economic or political targets. In this paper 
the short-run  results  of such  a  policy are put  in the 
background  of analysing the  long-run consequences 
of a  loose  fiscal  stance.  In  an  international  context 
government deficits may be reflected in deficits on the 
current account and such twin deficits have important 
consequences for long-run welfare. There are a number 
of interesting  and  related  questions  which  may  be 
asked  in  this  connection.  A  rise  in  government 
expenditure crowds out private spending. How are the 
consequences of crowding out spread across different 
countries?  The  answer  to  this  question  is  directly 
related to the functioning of the international capital 
market. However, a rise in exhaustive public spending 
may  also  crowd  out  public  investment.  Empirical 
evidence of a  decline in the share of general govern- 
ment investment spending in a large number of OECD 
countries is provided by Tanzi and Lutz [21]. More- 
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over, for the period considered (1970-87) the authors 
find a  negative correlation between capital spending 
and  interest  payments  in  a  sample  of  18  countries. 
Public choice considerations may be invoked to stress 
the likelihood of this kind of crowding out. There are 
no strong constituencies to protect outlays on public 
capital formation. Moreover, the benefits to be reaped 
from public investment are far ahead in the future, so 
that  the  political  value  of  such  expenditures  is 
relatively low. Therefore, a growth in public debt may 
in time lead to increases in taxes as well as to changes 
in the structure of public expenditure with government 
investment  being  squeezed  out  by  rising  interest 
payments. If so, the question arises of what price has 
to be paid in the long run and again to what extent 
the burden can be shifted towards other nations. 
The  problems  raised  above  will  be  discussed  by 
introducing a general equilibrium two-country model 
with  imperfect  financial  asset  substitution  and  im- 
perfect commodity substitution across countries. The 
model takes account of optimizing agents, finite lives, 
capital accumulation, intertemporal budget constraints 
for  the  governments  and  private  sectors,  current 
account  dynamics  and  floating  exchange  rates.  It 
differs from existing two-country optimizing models 
(eg Buiter [9], Giovannini [11], Van der Ploeg [18], 
Van de Klundert and Van der Ploeg [15]) in a number 
of ways.  First,  although  financial  capital  is  highly 
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mobile internationally, substitution of assets is assumed 
to  be  imperfect.  Studies  on  rates  of return  provide 
empirical evidence against  the notion that  assets are 
(nearly)  perfectly  substitutable  (cf  Bovenberg  and 
Goulder [5]), Second, it is assumed  that  production 
of commodities requires social overhead capital, which 
is accumulated by government investment. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next two 
sections the model is introduced in  some detail, and 
an overview is presented of the results obtained if the 
foreign government (say the  USA) runs  a  deficit for 
some time. The subsequent section discusses numerical 
exercises, which  provide a  more elaborate picture of 
the development of the wealth of nations concerned. 
The paper closes with some concluding remarks. 
A two-country model with imperfect asset 
and commodity substitution 
Consumption  and saving  decisions 
The  demand  side  of  each  country  is  made  up  of 
identical  consumers  with  a  constant  probability  of 
death (fi) and a constant pure rate of time preference 
(~)  as  in  the  analysis  of Blanchard  [3].  There is  no 
intergenerational bequest motive. To avoid unintended 
bequests individuals buy life insurance. The individual 
born at  time s~<t  receives (pays) for every period of 
his life a  premium, flW(s, t)  and  at the time of death 
the  individual's  net  wealth,  W(s,t)  goes  to  the  life 
insurance company. The consumers born at time s ~< t 
have  homothetic  preferences  over  consumption  at 
time  t  of home  goods,  Ch(S,t),  and  foreign  goods, 
C,,(s,t).  Labour  supply  of  individuals  is  inelastic. 
Consumers face a  two-stage decision problem. In the 
first stage they decide upon total consumption, C(s, t), 
in the present period against total consumption later 
in time. To simplify somewhat it is assumed that  the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution is unity. In the 
second stage consumers make an optimal choice with 
regard  to  home  and  foreign  goods  given  total 
consumption of the first stage problem. 
The first stage maximization problem can be stated 
as: 
Max U(t) =  log[C(Ch(S, v), Cm(S, V)] 
{(3 
x exp((e + fl)(t -  v)) dv  (1) 
subject  to  the  individual  consumer's  intertemporal 
budget constraint, 
(V(s, t) = (?(t) + fl)W(s, t) + YL(S, t)-- T(s, t) 
-- C(s, t)Pc(t)  (2) 
and the condition precluding Ponzi games: 
[ ;/  ,d.]  Lim exp  -  (?(tt)+fl  W(s,v)=O 
t  -*  i  (3) 
where  YL denotes labour income, P~ denotes the price 
index of the consumption basket,  Y denotes income 
received  and  T  denotes  lump  sum  taxes  paid.  The 
variable ? relates to the average return on the portfolio 
of domestic residents, who hold domestic and foreign 
bonds as explained below 1  . The problem can be solved 
by standard methods (eg Blanchard and Fischer [4]). 
Applying the relevant aggregation  procedure we can 
write total consumption as: 
C(s, t)P,.(t) = (:¢ + fl)(W(s, t) + H(s, t))  (4) 
where human wealth at time t  of an individual born 
at time s is given by 
H(s,t)=  [YL(s,v)-- T(s,v)] 
(5) 
The second stage maximization problem can now be 
formulated as: 
Max U(Ch(s, t), C,,(s, t))  (6) 
{C~,,C,,,} 
subject to the budget constraint 
Ch(S, t) + E(t)Cm(s, t) = C(s, t)Pc(t)  (7) 
where E denotes the real exchange rate ie the price of 
foreign goods  in  units  of the  domestic good,  which 
the individual consumer takes as given. Maximization 
of the instantaneous utility function, which is assumed 
to be homothetic, results in the following expressions: 
Ch(s,t)=~(E(t))C(s,t)Pc(t)  @'t >0  t8) 
C,,(s,t)=qJ2(E(t))C(s,t)Pc(t)  ~<0  (9) 
Substitution  of these  outcomes  back  in  the  instan- 
taneous utility function leads to an expression for the 
price index of total consumption: 
Pc(t)=~3(E(t))  (10) 
Denoting  the  share  of domestic  bonds  in  total  wealth  by  2,  the 
average rate of return  is given by ~ = 2r +  ( 1 -  21(r* + E/E). 
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To  obtain  aggregate  results  we  have  to  sum  over 
generations.  At  every  instant  in  time  a  cohort  or 
generation with a probability of death, 13, is born. The 
size at  time  t  of a  cohort born  at  time s~<t equals 
flexp(-fl(s-t)). Therefore, total population at time 
t  is  ~flexp(-fl(s-t))ds=l.  The  aggregation pro- 
cedure is explained in Blanchard [3], Blanchard and 
Fischer [4] and Buiter [10]. Here it will suffice to give 
the  results.  Aggregate  consumption  follows  from 
Equation (4): 
C(t )P~(t ) = (~ + fl)(W (t ) + H (t ) )  (11) 
The solution for aggregate non-human wealth follows 
from 
IV(t) = ~(t)W(t) + YL(t)- T(t)- C(t)  (12) 
The derivation of (12) made use of the fact that the 
non-human wealth  of newly born  individuals must 
be  zero,  W(t,t)=O,  because  there  are  no  bequests. 
The  behaviour  of aggregate  human  wealth  can  be 
characterized by: 
I~I(t) = (?(t) + fl)H(t) -  YL(t) + T(t)  (13) 
Aggregation over the demand equations (8) and  (9) 
is straightforward and can be left to the reader. 
Portfolio choice 
It is assumed that financial assets within each country 
are  perfect  substitutes  but  that  they  are  imperfect 
substitutes across countries. There are several explana- 
tions for the apparent imperfect substitutability, but 
the main point seems to be risk. Individuals may hold 
portfolios consisting of assets  of different countries 
despite a  difference  in  returns, because  of exchange 
risks  or risks  of expropriation. Exchange risk  could 
be  eliminated by assuming that agents have perfect 
foresight, so that they can predict changes in the real 
exchange rate  accurately (eg  Branson  [7],  Branson 
and Henderson [8]). That leaves  one with sovereign 
risk  and other forms of uncertainty. 
The  modelling of imperfect substitution in  assets 
may go along different lines. An elegant manner would 
be to integrate portfolio choice under uncertainty in 
the utility maximization problem of households. The 
introduction of uncertainty is beyond the scope of the 
present  paper.  Instead, a  compromise procedure  as 
in  Goulder  and  Eichengreen  [12],  Bovenberg  and 
Goulder  [5,6]  could  have  been  applied.  In  these 
papers  the portfolio choice is based on a  preference 
function with  the  shares  devoted  to  domestic  and 
foreign assets as arguments. Embedding the portfolio 
preference  function in the intertemporal utility func- 
tion, households make choices  with regard  to  asset 
holding and consumption in a consistent way. 
Here we follow a more direct approach by assuming 
that the shares of assets  of a  given  country in total 
wealth depend upon the relative  return: 
Bh-pl(r-r*  +  P'I >O  (14) 
W  -P2  r-r*+  pz<O  (15) 
where Bh denotes the amount of domestic assets  and 
Bm denotes the amount of foreign assets expressed  in 
units of the foreign good. In contrast to Bovenberg 
and  Goulder  [5,6],  Equations  (14) and  (15) take 
account  of  exchange  rate  expectations,  although 
foreign  and  domestic  assets  remain  imperfect  sub- 
stitutes. Clearly in a model with far-sighted agents the 
exchange rate should jump in response to news about 
exogenous  variables.  It  may  be  argued  that  the 
procedure chosen is ad hoc and may hamper proper 
welfare  comparisons. However, the argument is not 
fully convincing as the utility of asset shares remains 
a rather opaque concept. 
Production and capital accumulation 
Firms produce under perfect  foresight and maximize 
the  present  value  of the  cash  flow,  V,  subject  to  a 
concave and twice differentiable production function 
Y=f(K,S)  fK>O  fs>O  frr<O  fss<O  (16) 
where  Y denotes aggregate production, K denotes the 
stock of privately owned capital  and  S denotes the 
stock of social overhead capital as in Arrow and Kurz 
[1].  An  empirical justification for  including public 
capital as an argument in the production function is 
provided by Aschauer [2]. It turns out that the case 
of constant returns to scale across all factors, private 
and  public,  gives  better  statistical  results  than  the 
alternative of increasing returns over all inputs. In this 
case the adding-up constraint requires  that the rents 
from public services are appropriated by the private 
factors of production. To avoid this complication it 
will  be  assumed  here  that  the  production  function 
exhibits  constant  returns  with  respect  to  private 
factors. Labour supply is exogenous by assumption 
and a  flexible  real  wage  rate  is  supposed  to equate 
labour demand and supply at every moment in time. 
The demand for labour can therefore be  eliminated 
from the production function. 
The remaining problem for the firm is to choose an 
optimal  capital  stock.  To  derive  a  well  behaved 
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investment  function  it  is  necessary  to  introduce 
installation cost with respect to newly installed capital 
(eg Hayashi [14]). The investment expenditure func- 
tion based on capital accumulation, I, and installation 
cost is written as: 
J=g(I,K)  gt>O  gK<O  gt1>0  (17) 
The decision problem for the representative firm can 
now be formulated as: 
Max V(t)=  [f(K(v),  S(v))-g(l(v),  K(v))] 
(18) 
subject to an initial condition for K  and the accumu- 
lation equation 
I£(t) = l(t)- 6KK(t )  (19) 
where 6  K is a constant rate of depreciation. It should 
be  noticed  that  Equation  (18)  implies  that  each 
country  specializes  in  the  production  of  its  own 
exportable. Moreover, it is assumed that firms finance 
their investment outlays on the domestic market for 
loans. Therefore, the domestic interest rate can be used 
to discount future cash flows. 
Denoting  the  costate  variable associated  with  the 
stock  of capital  by  Q  and  applying  the  maximum 
principle results in the first order conditions 
g,(l(t),  K(t)) = Q(t)  (20) 
O.(t) = (r(t) + 6~)Q(t)-fK(K(t),  S(t))+ g~(I(t),  K(t)) 
(21) 
Moreover, the following transversality condition must 
hold: 
ment budget constraint: 
{)(t)=r(t)  D(t)+Gc(t)+G,(t )-  T(t)  (23) 
The No Ponzi game (NPG) or solvency condition for 
the government can be written as: 
 imexpE  0  (24) 
Integration  of  Equation  (23)  subject  to  the  NPG 
condition (24) gives: 
ft °° 
D(t) =  IT(v)- Go(v)- Gt (v)] 
(25) 
so  that  real government debt plus  the present  value 
of future government spending has to be paid off by 
the  present  value  of future lump  sum  taxes.  Notice 
that the assumption of finite lives (probability of death 
greater than zero) drives a wedge between the discount 
rate  used  to calculate  human  wealth,  r +3,  and  the 
discount  rate  used  to  calculate  government debt,  r. 
This  is  the  main  reason  why  the  Ricardian  debt 
neutrality theorem does not hold, so that the burden 
of  higher  taxation  can  be  passed  on  to  future 
generations. 
For the solvency condition of the government to be 
satisfied, one needs some control rule on taxation or 
spending. Following Phillips [17] three such rules can 
be distinguished when applied to taxation: 
(i)  A proportional policy rule of the type: 
T(t) = To + ~lD(t)  (26) 
(ii)  An integral control rule of the type: 
lim exp  -  r(t)ds  v)K(v)=O  (22) 
Equation (20) gives the rate of investment as a function 
of Tobin's Q. The behaviour of the costate variable Q 
follows from Equation (21). 
The government  budget  constra&t 
The government services its debt (D), spends on home 
goods, levies lump sum taxes and finances the resulting 
deficit  by  borrowing.  Government  spending  is  split 
among public consumption (Go)  and public investment 
(GI). These assumptions are captured by the govern- 
T(t) = ~zD(t)  (27) 
(iii)  A derivative policy rule of the type: 
T(t) = T  o + ~219(t)  ~2 > 1  (28) 
These rules  have  different implications  for long-run 
debt in case of a  permanent increase in  government 
spending, starting from a steady state with zero debt. 
Under rule (iii) government debt falls in the new steady 
state,  so that  the rise in exhaustive spending can  be 
financed by a  reduction in interest payments. Under 
rule (ii) long-run debt does not change and taxation 
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rises just enough to finance the increase in spending, 
whereas  under  (i)  long-run  debt  rises  and  taxation 
increases  to  cover  both  the  increase  in  exhaustive 
spending and the rise  in debt  service.  Here  we  will 
stick  to  rule  (i)  as  we  intend  to  analyse  the  con- 
sequences  of an increase in government debt in the 
short run as well as in the long run, which may follow 
from the simple logic behind the proportional policy 
rule. However, as an alternative to Equation (26) we 
will consider the case where a permanent increase in 
public consumption is financed by crowding out  of 
public investment according to: 
G~(t) = Glo -- 7r 1D(t)  (29) 
Finally, it should be noted that the accumulation of 
social overhead capital is given by: 
$(t) = G,(t)- 6,S(t)  (30) 
where 6~ is a  constant rate of depreciation  of social 
overhead capital. 
International &terdependence 
The  world  consists  of two  countries  with  identical 
structures. The foreign country has similar relation- 
ships to the one discussed above and its variables are 
denoted by an asterisk. There is no mobility of labour 
or  physical capital  between  the  two  countries.  The 
condition for equilibrium in the home goods market 
is given by: 
Y =Ch + I +G~+GI+C*m  (31) 
and the one for the foreign goods markets reads: 
Y*=C* + I* +G* +G* +Cm  (32) 
Equilibrium in the market for domestic assets is given 
by: 
D+ KQ=Bh + B*  (33) 
It  is  assumed  that  installation  costs  are  such  that 
marginal  Q  is  average  Q  (eg  Hayashi  1-14]).  The 
left-hand side of Equation (33)  relates to the supply 
of domestic  assets,  which  differs  from  non-human 
wealth by the net claim on foreign assets: 
W=Bh + EBm=D+ KQ+ F  (34) 
so that F = EBm- B*. Asset market equilibrium in the 
market for foreign assets requires 
D* + K*Q* = B~ + Bm  (35) 
Non-human wealth in the foreign country is equal to 
R*  F 
W* = B* + -m = D* + K'Q* -  --  (36) 
E  E 
The current account consists of net interest payments 
plus the balance of trade and equals the increase in 
national wealth: 
[:(t)=[  r*(t)+~-!t!lE(t)Bm(t)E(t)l 
-  r(t)B*~(t) + C*m(t)- E(t)Cm(t)  (37) 
An overview  of the results 
An  analytic  solution  of  the  complete  model  is 
intractable. However, solutions can be obtained for a 
truncated model, which may serve as a benchmark for 
a  discussion  of simulation  results.  This  benchmark 
model focuses on  real  exchange  rate  dynamics and 
current account dynamics. Investment is ignored and 
it is assumed that households have static expectations 
with respect to future income streams. In addition, no 
account is taken of the dynamics of the government 
budget constraint. Global results for the benchmark 
model are presented in the next subsection. Details of 
the solution are given in the appendix. The effects of 
an increase in government spending in the full model 
are discussed in the second subsection, where we shall 
summarize the main results of our simulations making 
use of graphics showing the time paths of some key 
variables in the model. A more detailed discussion of 
the outcomes will be given in the next section. 
The benchmark model 
The state variables in the benchmark model are the 
real  exchange  rate,  which  is  a  forward  looking 
variable,  and  foreign  debt,  which  is  a  backward 
looking variable. The phase diagram for the dynamic 
system is given in Figure 1. In the appendix it is shown 
by linearizing the model in the neighbourhood of a 
steady state solution that both the/~ = 0 locus and the 
= 0 locus are negatively sloped. Moreover, it can be 
proved that for reasonable values of the parameters 
the  slope  of  the  /~=0  locus  is  larger  in  absolute 
value than the slope of the F = 0 locus. Therefore, the 
system  exhibits  saddlepoint  stability.  The  initial 
equilibrium is at point A in Figure 1. 
The  negative  slope  of  the  /~=0  locus  can  be 
explained  as  follows.  Starting  from  a  point  on  the 
curve an appreciation of the domestic real exchange 
rate (E~,) induces a  trade deficit which is to be offset 
by  rising  income  on  foreign  assets  through  rising 
foreign claims  (FT).  Following Stevenson  et al  1-20] 
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Figure 1. Phase diagram for the dynamic system. 
this may be seen as the open economy variant of the 
coupon  effect.  The  negative  slope  of the  /~=0  locus 
relates to the role of exchange rate expectations in the 
model.  The  announcement  of  a  current  account 
improvement will generate expectations of a fall in the 
exchange  rate.  Therefore,  an  effective  increase  in 
foreign  assets  (FT)  accompanied  by  an  appropriate 
appreciation of the real exchange rate (E+) may keep 
expectations from changing. 
The effects of an increase in  government spending 
abroad,  say the  USA,  are illustrated  in  Figure  1.  As 
shown in the appendix, the/~ = 0 locus and the [" = 0 
locus shift upwards and a new steady state is attained 
at point B. On impact of the shock the real exchange 
rate jumps towards  the  stable arm of the saddlepath 
(the dotted line in Figure 1  ). A positive demand shock 
in  the  USA  induces  a  real dollar appreciation and  a 
current account deficit as net exports are crowded out. 
Over time the system moves along the stable arm of 
the saddlepath towards point B. US foreign debt rises 
and  a  real  dollar  depreciation  is  required  to  restore 
long-run  equilibrium.  In  the  long  run  the  crowding 
out effect may still dominate the coupon effect, so that 
the real exchange rate in dollar terms is higher in the 
new steady state compared to its initial  position. 
In the complete model there are a number of factors 
which  complicate  the  picture.  First,  the  foreign 
government has to finance  an  increase  in exhaustive 
expenditure.  This  may  lead  to  a  rise  in  the  supply 
of  foreign  bonds.  Second,  increasing  interest  rates 
depress private investment so that the supply of goods 
diminishes.  This negative supply effect reinforces the 
excess demand for US goods and therefore contributes 
to  an  appreciation  of the  real  dollar  rate.  Third,  it 
makes a great difference whether the solvency problem 
of the  government  is  solved  by  raising  taxes  or  by 
cutting public investment. In the next subsection these 
factors  will  be  taken  into  account  in  discussing  the 
effects of an increase in government spending abroad. 
The  complete model 
Some main  results  of a  rise in  government  spending 
in the foreign country (say the USA) under a  tax rule 
are shown in Figure 2. On impact there is a real dollar 
appreciation as US goods are in excess demand. Over 
time the real exchange rate falls as may be expected. 
Ultimately,  the  rate  stabilizes  at  a  level  above  the 
initial  steady-state value. There is no need for a  real 
dollar depreciation  in the long run to service foreign 
debt  (coupon effect).  Because  investment is crowded 
out  US goods remain in short supply compared with 
the initial situation and the coupon effect is dominated 
by the crowding  out effect. 
The  long-run  results  therefore  correspond  to  the 
outcome  in  the  benchmark  model.  Foreign  debt 
increases  and  private  consumption  in  the  USA  falls 
substantially. The fall in consumption is the net result 
of a  crowding out effect accompanied by a decline in 
the  stock  of capital  on  the  one  hand  and  a  positive 
2.00 
c  -->c 





---)=  long-run  values  ~  c* 
-10.00 
-12.00  a  I  I  I  I  I  -I  c* 
0.0  10.0  20.0  30.0  q0.0  50.0  60.0 
6.00 [-"  -->  f 
/ 
5'°° I  f 
4"00  I 
3.00~ 
2.00F  /  -  -  -  -  e --~ e 
I  / 
1  "°° ~///h  I/h 
o  oov-  ,  ~  ,  ,  ,  , 
0.0  I0.0  20.0  30.0  40.0  50.0  60.0 
Figure 2. Tax rule. 









I  I  I 
c  --)  c 
c* 
--')  = long-run  values 
--) c* 
a 
I  I  I  I  I  I 














i  1  I  I  I 
10.0  20.0  30.0  40.0  50.0 




terms of trade effect on the other hand.  For Europe 
the  latter  effect  works,  of  course,  in  the  opposite 
direction  and  consumption  increases  on  balance  in 
this region. 
Things  are  quite  different  if the  solvency  of  the 
government is maintained by a control rule on public 
investment, as appears  from Figure  3.  Under a  rule 
on  public  investment  the  real  exchange  rate jumps 
upwards on impact and falls thereafter relatively fast 
for two reasons. First, as in the other cases discussed, 
the coupon effect necessitates a real dollar depreciation. 
Second,  aggregat  e  demand  falls  in  the  USA  as  the 
government spends less on domestic goods for public 
investment.  The  real  dollar  depreciation  checks  the 
increase in foreign debt. 
The spending  effect of public investment precedes 
the capacity effect, but crowding out  of government 
investment leads to a fall in social overhead capital in 
the  course  of  time.  As  a  result  output  decreases 
substantially in the USA. The fall in output is caused 
by the combined effect of a  decline in private capital 
and a  decline in social overhead capital. When these 
developments acquire momentum things are reversed 
because the supply effect then induces a gradual real 
dollar  appreciation.  As  the  real  dollar  appreciation 
continues foreign debt rises further because US goods 
remain in excess demand. Long-run consumption falls 
substantially in the US economy despite a significant 
improvement in the terms of trade. The outcome for 
European welfare remains to be seen. As will be shown 
in the next section, long-run aggregate consumption 
increases slightly in Europe despite the adverse terms 
of trade effect. 
Finally, it should be noticed that it takes more time 
to attain the steady-state values of the variables under 
a rule on public investment compared with a stabilizing 
tax  rule.  In  the  former case  the  dynamic process  is 
complicated  by  the  accumulation  of public  capital 
which  interacts  with  the  accumulation  of  private 
capital. 
Simulation results: a  closer look 
The numerical effects of an increase in US government 
spending  by  5%  of GNP  are  presented  in  Tables  1 
and 2. The results under a tax rule to assure govern- 
ment solvency are discussed in the first subsection; the 
numerical outcomes under a rule on public investment 
are  then  looked  at.  Computations  are  based  on  a 
algorithm presented in Van der  Ploeg and  Markink 
[19]. 2 
A fiscal deficit  under a  tax rule 
The effects of a  rise in government spending under a 
tax rule are shown in Table 1. As the model assumes 
forward looking behaviour of agents it may be useful 
to discuss the long-run results first. Government debt 
in  the  foreign  country,  say  the  USA,  increases 
substantially  in  the  long  run.  Therefore the  interest 
rate on dollar denominated bonds rises, which leads 
to a crowding out of investment in the US economy. 
Because  foreign  and  domestic  bonds  are  imperfect 
substitutes the rise in the European interest rate stays 
behind the increase in the US interest rate. Investment 
in Europe is therefore less harmed. The rise in interest 
rates and fall in output  (as a  result of the decline in 
capital)  reduce  human  wealth  in  both  regions.  The 
decline  in  human  wealth  is,  of  course,  more  pro- 
nounced in  the  USA  where taxes  must  be increased 
to eliminate the government deficit. 
With respect to non-human wealth the developments 
across countries are qualitatively different. In the USA 
non-human wealth declines for two reasons. First, as 
noted above the capital stock  falls.  Second, external 
2 To  apply the algorithm the model has to be linearized around  a 
steady-state  solution.  The  log  linear version  of  the  model  along 
with the parameter values applied in the simulations is given in the 
appendix. 
ECONOMIC  MODELLING July  1993  279 Crowding out Of private and public capital accumulation:  T. van de Klun&,rt 
Table l. Fiscal deficit in the USA under a  tax rule. 
Period 
VariablC  0  5 
Europe 
Total consumption (c)  -  1.17 
Consumption  domestic goods (ch)  0.24 
Consumption foreign goods (c,,,)  -5,40 
Non-human  wealth (w)  -0.38 
Human  wealth (h)  -0.78 
Capital stock (k)  0 
Interest rate (r)  -0,10 
Government  debt (d)  0 
Domestic bonds (bh)  -0.59 
Foreign bonds (b,,)  -2.40 
USA 
Total consumption (c*)  -2A3  -2.94  -10.76 
Consumption domestic goods (c*)  -3.84  4.25  -  11,68 
Consumption foreign goods (c*)  1.80  0.97  -7.97 
Non-human  wealth (w*)  -  1.60  -  1.70  -  10.39 
Human  wealth (h*)  -9.27  -11.19  -14.55 
Capital stock (k*)  0  -  t.36  -  8,97 
Interest rate (r*)  -0.09  0.22  0.46 
Government  debt (d*)  0  10,26  12.13 
Domestic bonds (b~')  -  1.40  -  1.01  -8,38 
Foreign bonds (b*)  0.42  -1.82  -I6.57 
World 
Real exchange rate (e)  2.82  2.6t  1,86 
US foreign debt (f)  0  0.93  564 
- 0.47  1.62 
0.84  2.55 
-4,38  -1.17 
0.10  3.57 
0.50  -3.86 
-0.39  --2.66 
0.06  0.14 
0.06  0.30 
-0.58  1.56 
0,22  9,75 
"Variables are expressed as percentage deviations from initial steady 
state values (except Jfor which it is the deviation as a percentage 
of W and r, r*, for which it is t00 times the absolute deviations). 
Table 2. Fiscal deficit in the USA under a rule on public investment. 
Period 
VariablC  0  5 
Europe 
Total consumption  (c)  0.83 
Consumption domestic goods (c~)  1.42 
Consumption  foreign goods (c,~)  -0.92 
Non-human  wealth (w)  -0.41 
Human  wealth (h)  7.29 
Capital stock (k)  0 
lnterest rate (r)  0.72 
Government  debt (d}  0 
Domestic bonds (b~)  -0.29 
Foreign bonds (b,,)  -2.06 
USA 
Total consumption (c*)  -2.71 
Consumption domestic goods (c*)  -3.29 
Consumption foreign goods (c*)  -0.96 
Non-human  wealth (w*)  -0.13 
Human  wealth (h*)  -4.85 
Capital stock (k*)  0 
Interest rate (r*)  2.28 
Government  debt (d*)  0 
Domestic bonds (b*)  -2.66 
Foreign bonds (b*)  --0,89 
World 
Real exchange rate (e)  1.17 




























-  3.66 













-  20.59 
-  19.54 
6,42 
5.36 
° See Table 1. 
debt rises as a  result of deficits on the current account, 
In Europe the stock of capital declines somewhat  but 
the  stock  of  foreign  assets  rises  and  as  a  result 
non-human wealth increases on balance. This explains 
the  rise  in  European  consumption,  whereas  total 
consumption in the USA falls significantly despite an 
increase  in  the  US  terms  of  trade.  A  real  dollar 
appreciation leads to a  decline in consumers prices in 
the USA and vice versa in Europe. The outcome with 
respect  to  the  real exchange  rate  is  the net  result  of 
opposing  forces,  The  relatively large  decline  in  the 
US output raises the relative price of US goods (supply 
effect).  In contrast,  the  interest payments  on  foreign 
debt (coupon effect) require a real dollar depreciation. 
In our exercise the supply effect dominates the coupon 
effect, as illustrated in Table  I. 
The short-run picture is quite different, On impact 
of the  shock  human  wealth  falls in  the  USA  which 
leads to a decline in aggregate consumption. It should 
be observed in this connection  that  human  wealth  is 
a  forward  looking variable which  reflects  the  fall in 
income  and  rise  of  interest  rates  in  the  future.  In 
Europe human wealth declines slightly, which induces 
a  fall  in  consumption  expenditure.  The  volume  of 
consumption declines even more,  because of a  rise in 
the  consumption  price  level.  There  is  a  real  dollar 
appreciation  on  impact,  as  US  goods  are  in  excess 
demand.  The  European  import  of  goods  declines 
substantially,  whereas  import  in  the  USA  rises.  A 
similar  pattern  can  be  deduced  with  respect  to  the 
allocation of domestic and foreign bonds, 
As  can  be  observed,  the  results  differ  from  the 
standard Mundell-Fleming model, where an increase 
in government spending is a  locomotive policy in the 
short run.  In the present model a  rise in government 
spending in the USA is a  beggar thy neighbour policy 
in the short run, but it allows Europe to have a  higher 
welfare level in the long run. Instantaneous welfare in 
the  USA falls gradually, but  it should  be  noted  that 
the increase in public expenditure may convey direct 
utility to consumers.  The rise in the real interest rate 
is higher in  the  USA over the entire period,  because 
the  supply of US bonds  increases until a  new  steady 
state is attained. 
A fiscal d@'eit under a  rule on public investment 
The  budget  deficit  in  the  USA  is  now  closed  by 
crowding out  of government  investment.  The effects 
of an increase in exhaustive government spending are 
given  in  Table  2.  The  decline in  the  stock  of social 
overhead  capital  leads  to  a  deterioration  of  the 
marginal productivity of privately owned capital. As 
a  result,  the  accumulation  of  capital  is  seriously 
affected in the USA in the long run.  Inspection of the 
long-run results in Tables 1 and 2 shows to what extent 
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the  stock  of capital  is  reduced under  an  investment 
rule in comparison with a tax rule. As a  result of the 
dramatic decline in the stock of capital US output falls 
substantially. The resulting excess demand for goods 
originating in the USA induces a real dollar apprecia- 
tion of about 6.5% in the long run. Total consumption 
benefits from the improvement in the terms of trade; 
nevertheless  the  ultimate  result  is  strongly  negative 
because real human and non-human wealth is severely 
depressed. The long-run effect on European consump- 
tion  and  welfare  is  slightly  positive  despite  the 
deterioration  in  the  European  terms  of trade.  US 
foreign debt changes  by about  the  same  amount  in 
both cases. The same holds true for public debt in the 
USA, so that the shocks are on equal footing in the 
case of a  tax rule and in the case of a  rule on public 
investment. However, different stories lie behind these 
more or less equal long-run results. This is best seen 
by turning  to the  short-run  and  medium-run effects 
in the case of a rule on public investment. 
It should be noticed that crowding out on impact 
of the shock is now governed by a rise in interest rates. 
This result contrasts with the impact effects in the case 
of a tax rule, where crowding out takes the form of a 
reduction  in  US  exports.  In  the  present  case  this 
phenomenon is less pronounced, so that the real dollar 
appreciation on impact is moderate compared to the 
outcome in Table 1. The explanation for this difference 
in  results  is  clear,  but  at  the  same  time  somewhat 
complicated. In the case of a rule on public investment 
there is  a  strong dollar depreciation  in  the  medium 
run,  the  reason for which  will  be  given shortly. An 
expected depreciation of the dollar reduces the average 
rate of return on the portfolio of European households. 
Consequently, human wealth rises and aggregate con- 
sumption in Europe increases. To restore equilibrium 
in the markets for goods the interest rates have to rise. 
In the medium run the dollar depreciates relatively 
fast in  real terms under the influence of the coupon 
effect (connected with  an  increase  in  external  debt) 
and  a  reversed crowding  out  effect (connected with 
the decline in public investment necessary to stabilize 
the  government  budget).  The  real  exchange  rate 
attains its lowest value at t = 5. Thereafter, the process 
is  reversed  as  excess  demand  for  US  denominated 
goods again becomes the dominating factor. But this 
time excess demand is not caused by an autonomous 
shock as at t =0, but by the fall in US supply under 
the influence of a  decline in the stock of private and 
social capital.  The parabolic shape of the  time path 
of the  real exchange rate of the dollar is typical for 
the case of a rule on public investment compared with 
a stabilizing rule based on taxes. The developments in 
the medium run are thus not indicative for the long- 
run results, which may come as a  surprise. 
Concluding remarks 
This  paper  focuses  on  imbalances  in  the  world 
economy caused by a unilateral increase in government 
spending, say in the USA. The results depend on the 
type of control rule applied to maintain  solvency of 
the governments. It is argued that proportional rules 
are most likely to be applied from a political point of 
view. 
An  increase  in  US  government spending  under  a 
tax  rule  induces  a  real  dollar  appreciation  and 
crowding out of exports in the short run.  Aggregate 
consumption and  investment  as  well as  exports are 
choked  off  to  maintain  equilibrium  in  the  goods 
market. Aggregate consumption in Europe falls too, 
because the European terms of trade deteriorate. 
In the longer run developments are to a large extent 
determined  by  the  process  of capital  decumulation, 
which  is  most  pronounced in  the  spending  country. 
Imperfections in the capital  markets  restrict the rise 
in  European  interest  rates  so  that  there  capital 
accumulation is less affected. As US external debt rises 
the dollar depreciates in  real terms,  but  the coupon 
effect is mitigated by the supply effect, implying that 
mutations in the real exchange rate are moderate. In 
the  long  run  the  US  terms  of  trade  improve  but 
aggregate  (private)  consumption  falls  along  with  a 
decline  in  real  wealth.  In  contrast,  aggregate  con- 
sumption in Europe rises as a result of the increase in 
(net) foreign wealth. 
Under a rule on public investment private and social 
overhead  capital  are  crowded  out  in  concert.  Real 
wealth  and  aggregate  consumption  decline substan- 
tially. Movements in the real exchange rate are now 
primarily governed by the expenditure and  capacity 
effects of changes  in  public  investment.  In  the  long 
run  the  terms of trade  of the  US  economy improve 
significantly.  As  a  consequence  long-run  aggregate 
consumption in Europe increases only slightly. 
The examples given illustrate the dangers of short- 
sighted economic policy measures if account is taken 
of their full long-run implications. Government debt 
imposes a  burden on future generations if as a  result 
capital accumulation is impaired. Moreover, imperfec- 
tions in capital markets reduce the negative spill over 
effects to other regions and therefore increase the long- 
run  burden for the  (net) debtor country.  Finally, it 
should be noticed that the situation may even be worse 
than shown in the paper. A fall in capital accumulation 
may affect other determinants of economic growth as 
emphasized in recent studies (eg Lucas [16], Grossman 
and Helpman [13]). Subsequent contributions on the 
long-run effects of  crowding out could therefore benefit 
from results obtained by this new theory of economic 
growth. 
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Appendix 
The linear version of the complete model 
The  model presented  in  the  paper is  linearized around  a 
steady-state solution. Lower-case letters denote percentage 
deviations  from  the  steady-state  solutions  of the  corres- 
ponding variables denoted by upper-case letters. An excep- 
tion is the rate of interest, which is measured as an absolute 




c+p,,=~w+(1 -~)h  ~-  (38) 
W+H 
Consumption  of domestic goods 
Ch 
eh=c+(1 -lOq~e  p-  (39) 
C 
Consumption  (f.lbreign goods 
e,, = c -  p q~e  (40) 
Consumers"  price 
p,.= (1 -l~)e  (41) 
Private investment 
K 
i=k +  q  (42) 
Produetion 
y= vs + ~l + ( l -  :~)k  (43) 
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Aggregate demand 
y = y~c~ + vii ~- Yogi + (1 -- 7~ -- 7i -- ~o)  c* + g~ 
C h  I  G i 
7~-  y  ?i= ~  7g=  y 
Demand  domestic  bonds 
2(bh--w)=p(r--r*--~)  Z = Bh 
W 
Demand foreign  bonds 
( 1 -  2)(bm + e -  w) = -  p(r- r* -  k) 
Non-human  wealth 
K 
w=rl(k +q)+(1 -rl)d+ f  rl=- 
W 
Equilibrium  bonds market 
q(k +q)+ (1 -q)d=2bh+(1-2)b* 
Human  wealth 
I~=(~ + fl)h+ 2r +(1-2)(r* +O)-(~ + fl)(y-t) 
Tobin's q 
{t= (r + fk)q + r-- (r + fik)(y-- k ) 
Accumulation  of private  capital 
f~ = 6 k  (i -- k) 
Accumulation  of social overhead  capital 










Coefficients which are not defined are taken from the original 
model or are explained below. Equations (39) and (40) are 
obtained from an instantaneous CES utility function: 
0 = EaCh'+ (1 -a)C'~] u~' 
with  elasticity of substitution  q~=l/1-o~  and  preference 
parameter, a. The derivation of the investment equation (42) 
and the equation for the costate variable q is based on an 
investment  expenditure  function  with  quadratic  cost  of 




and a Cobb-Douglas production: 
Y = vS ~  (UK 1  - ~) 
Linearization of the other equations is straightforward. It 
should be noted that deviations of lump-sum taxes (t) and 
government consumption (go) are expressed as a percentage 
of initial output, whereas the deviation of external debt is 
expressed as a percentage of initial wealth. This is necessary 
because in the initial steady state these variables are assumed 
to be zero. 
The  linearized  equations  for  the  foreign  country  are 
similar  to  (38)-(56).  The  model  can  be  solved  for  23 
output variables (ie c, Pc, ch, cm, i, y, bh, bin, w, r, t, (gi) for both 
countries and e) and 12 state variables (k, h, s, d, f, q for both 
countries).  Invoking Walras's law one  of the  equilibrium 
conditions  can  be  eliminated,  so  that  the  number  of 
equations equals  the number  of variables. There are four 
forward looking state variables (h, q, for both countries) and 
nine backward looking state variables, but the variable f* 
can be omitted for convenience. 
The  numerical  examples  are  based  on  the  following 
plausible parameter values. 
Government  budget  constraint  Households 
Y 
d=fd+r  +~(gc-t)+~p~gg i  ~O--- 
D 
Solvency  rules 
(53) 
(p=2  #=0.75 
p=5  2=0.8 
Firms 
=0.8  /~=0.02 
t=to+~l  d 
0 
qi=gio--;~g d 
Balance of payments  constraint 
(54) 
(55) 
v=0.2  :t =0.68  x=0.125  t~k =0.025 
Government 
4=1  6~=0.02  ~1=0,0.5  z~l =0,0.5 
Miscellaneous 
f=~f+(1 -Z)(r* +~-r)+ z(c*~-e-Cm) 
X-(1-yc-?i-?g)(1 -r/)ff 
c* 
(56)  ?°=0.5  ~i=0.2 
In  all  cases  considered 
stability. 
yg=0.1  q=0.8  f=0.05 
the  model  exhibits  saddlepath 
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The  benchmark  model 
The benchmark model is obtained by ignoring investment 
and capital, assuming static expectations of households and 
eliminating  the government budget constraint (including  the 
solvency rules).  The  only exogenous  variable taken  into 
account is exhaustive government spending. 
The log-linear  version of the model can then be written as: 
Domestic country 
c+(1 -.)e=(w-~r 
Ch=C +(1 -.)~pe 
C  m =  C -- ,q~e 
,ch+(1 -.)c*+o~=O 
A(b h-  W) =  p(r-- r* -- b) 
(1-2)(b.+e-w) 
=  -- p(r--  r*  -- E) 
w=f 
Foreign country 
c* -  (1 -.)e  =  ~w* -  ~r* 
c* =c* -  (1 -  .)~oe 
c* = c* + ,~pe 
.Cff "~- (1 --.)Cm-~'g~c:O 
2(b~' -  w*) =  -  p(r -  r* -  b) 
(1 -  2)(b* -  ~ -  w*) 
=  p(r-  r*  -  b) 
International  interdependence 
f=ff  + (1-2)(r*+b-r)+z(c*-c-cm) 
2b  h + (1 -  2)b* = 0 
There are no taxes, so that human capital only depends on 
the rate of interest. Output is fixed  and the initial current 
account is in equilibrium.  As a result we have, = Ch/C = Ch/Y. 
Substitution of the equations for  both countries in the 
two  equations,  which  characterize  international  inter- 
dependence, yields a system of two differential equations in 
e and f: 
E=~l-2  2(1 --.){2.(~p- 1)+ 1  }J  -1  e 
I  2p  ~(2.- 1  ) 
+  +  +  --  * 
2p  3  ~(2-~1-1)(9c  9~) 
f=[~+  (22- l}(l-2)]f  +~Z{2.(~o~I)+ I } + (I-2)2]e 
2p  J  L  2.-  1  2p  d 
Z 




Figure 4. Saddle point stability. 
will both have a negative slope. For saddlepoint stability it 
is required that the f=0  locus is flatter than the b=0 locus 
as  illustrated in  Figure 4.  The  condition on  the  relative 
position of both curves can be expressed as 
2~  22 -  1  ?  22 -  1 
f-  4 
2p  1-2  2p  > 
1-2  2(1 -.){2#(~p- 1)+ 1  }  1-2  Z{2.(tp-- 1)+ 1}  ___+  __  + 
2p  ~(2.- 1)  2p  (1 --2)(2.- 1) 
In the present model we  have Z=(1-p)ff. Therefore,  the 
denominators  in  the  inequality  above  will  be  equal  if 
= 2(1 -2)/¢. In that case the condition  can be reduced to 
¢<211-21; 
r 
which  sets  an  upper  bound  on  the  interest  elasticity  of 
consumption. This condition may be fulfilled for a realistic 
range of parameter values. However, the denominators do 
not need to be equal. The denominator on the right-hand 
side of the inequality may be smaller, which sets  a  lower 
bound on the income-wealth ratio in the initial situation: 
2(1-2) 
Assuming that the MarshalI-Lerner conditions are fulfilled 
and assuming local goods preference, > 0.5 as well as local 
asset preference 2>0.5  the b=0 locus and the f=0  locus 
Taken  together  both  conditions  are  too  strong.  More 
generally, ~k should not be too small for the inequality to 
hold, which sounds reasonable. 
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